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Abstract 
A test battery is proposed that can be used to characterize the behaviour of updating systems. 
The battery is based on 20 rationality postulates of the types developed in studies of theory change 
and nonmonotonic reasoning. These postulates are arranged into seven sequences with increasing 
strength, each of which measures the degree of conformity with a basic desideratum for database 
updating. Some of these desiderata re partly in conflict, and they cannot all be satisfied to the 
highest degree. Mathematical characterizations are given of how far they can be combined. 
The recent rapid development in the areas of belief revision and nonmonotonic rea- 
soning has led to the introduction of a large number of rationality postulates for belief 
revision and database updating [ 1,5,6,10,12,13,15,16,18,21]. Some of these postulates 
can be used to characterize the behaviour of actual updating systems. For that purpose, 
the more operative of the postulates must be selected and systematized, and some of 
them need to be reformulated and adjusted. This is the task undertaken in the present 
paper. 
In Section 1, a framework for the characterization of updating systems is proposed. In 
Sections 2 and 3, the test battery is outlined, and in Section 4 the interrelations between 
the various criteria are investigated. Some concluding remarks are offered in Section 5. 
1. A conceptual framework 
In an influential 1982 paper, Allen Newell postulated the existence in Artificial Intelli- 
gence of a knowledge level [ 201. In the traditional hierarchy of system levels, beginning 
with the device level and the circuit level, the knowledge level is positioned immediately 
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above the symbol level (program level). The knowledge level is specified entirely in 
terms of the contents of the knowledge (beliefs). There is no distinction on this level 
between information that is explicitly available and information that is implied by avail- 
able information [4]. It should be possible to predict and understand what takes place 
on the knowledge level without referring to the symbol level, in much the same way as 
the symbol level should allow for prediction and understanding without reference to the 
lower levels of the system. 
The framework to be presented here is an application of knowledge level analysis. 
The contents of a database (before or after update) will be described on the knowledge 
level, i.e., in terms of what is implied by the information that the system can extract 
from it. Let us assume that we communicate with a database. Our communications are 
of two types: inputs (instructions) intended to change the state of the database and 
retrievals (question-answer dialogues) through which we find out whether or not a 
particular piece of information is supported by the database. The state of the system 
does not change between the inputs. By performing repeated retrievals before and after 
an update we can collect the information needed to characterize the effects of an update 
on a database. 
In order to abstract from the particular subject-matter, all information will be assumed 
to be represented by sentences in sentential logic. The contents of the database can then 
be characterized by a set containing all those sentences that it supports. This set is 
assumed to be closed under logical consequence. Hence, if a sentence follows logically 
from sentences that are supported by the database, then it is itself supported by the 
database. This idealizing assumption makes the framework conformable to models used 
in studies of belief revision and nonmonotonic inference. 
The two closely related formal frameworks of belief revision and nonmonotonic 
reasoning are both suitable for describing the behaviour of a database. In models of 
belief revision, the belief state of a person (or the state of a database) is represented by 
a set K of sentences, the “corpus” [ 171 or “belief set” [ 11. K is closed under logical 
consequence. In other words, K = Cn( K), where Cn is a consequence operator. (For 
every set A, Cn(A) is the set of logical consequences of A.) Revision, viz. belief- 
contravening incorporation of new information, is denoted *. Thus, K * a is the outcome 
of revising K to include the sentence LY. Contraction, i.e. the removal of a previous 
belief, is denoted f. K f a is the outcome of removing LY from K. 
In nonmonotonic reasoning (contrary to deduction), the receipt of new information 
may lead to the cancellation of old information. One way to study models of nonmono- 
tonic reasoning in a systematic way is to focus on the inference relation that such a 
model gives rise to [ 61. This relation is denoted by the symbol b. LY b p means that 
the sentence /3 is inferred from the sentence cy. Thus, in our framework, (Y k p means 
that after receiving the input information (Y, the database supports p. 
There is a close connection between nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision [ 191. 
Let K be a belief set and * an operator of revision for K. Then p E K * a means that 
from the new information CY we infer p, given the set K of background beliefs. This 
is another way of saying that (Y b p, where b denotes inferences according to K. If 
we want to be more precise, we can write (Y kK /3. Given a fixed set K of background 
beliefs, p E K * a and LY kK /? are just alternative notations. Using this relationship, 
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rationality postulates for nonmonotonic reasoning can be translated into postulates for 
belief change, and vice versa. 
The belief change framework is somewhat more versatile than that of nonmonotonic 
inference relations. It allows for accumulated (repeated) updating, such as K * (Y * /I, 
and for other types of change than revision, in particular contraction (K + a). The 
framework of nonmonotonic reasoning can be seen as a restriction of the belief revision 
framework to single incorporations of new beliefs. 
For the purposes of the present paper, the language of belief revision has been chosen. 
Thus, K denotes the state of the database before update, and K*a its state after the update 
that results from an instruction to accept (Y. Postulates that originate in the framework 
of nonmonotonic reasoning will be translated into the belief revision framework in the 
way indicated above. 
Criteria for rational incorporation of new information can be divided into three main 
categories. Those criteria that only concern update by one single sentence will be 
called elementary. Criteria that compare updates by different sentences will be called 
comparative. Criteria that refer to combined or repeated changes (such as K * (Y * p) 
are called compositive criteria. 
Elementary criteria will be treated in Section 3 and comparative criteria in Section 
4. Cornpositive criteria will not be treated here, since the few results on combined 
(repeated) change that are as yet available from the belief revision literature provide 
insufficient guidance. Much remains to be done before solid rationality criteria for 
combined operations of belief change or database updating are available. 
2. Elementary criteria 
After an update, we want the new state of the database to be a consistent state that 
supports the new information. Furthermore, we want the change to be conservative, 
i.e., unnecessary differences between the old and the new state should be avoided. 
No previous information should unnecessarily be lost, and no new information should 
unnecessarily be affixed. This adds up to four basic desiderata for database updating: 
( 1) The new information should be accepted (Success). 
(2) The new state should be consistent (Consistency) _ 
( 3) Unwarranted losses of old information should be avoided (Preservation). 
(4) Unwarranted addition of new information should be avoided (Repellence). 
The strongest possible version of Success is LY E K * a. However, this may be a too 
strong requirement since it forces us into inconsistency if cy itself is inconsistent. The 
very least that we can require is that if LY is already supported by a consistent database, 
then an update by a does not lead to the loss of this support. In the following series of 
four success postulates, each is stronger than the foregoing: 
Sl. IfaEKandTa#K,thencyEK*cu. 
S2. If SLY @ K, then (Y E K * a. 
S3. If SLY @ Cn( 8)) then a E K * (Y. 
s4. Ck!EK%=CL 
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S3 has been called weak SUCCESS by Rott [ 221. S4 is the success postulate commonly 
referred to in the belief revision literature [ 81. The corresponding principle in non- 
monotonic reasoning ((Y b (Y) has been called E@xAG~~. It is a basic requirement on 
inference, that “holds of all nonmonotonic inference relations currently in the litera- 
ture and indeed . . . should hold of any relation that deserves the name of ‘inference 
relation’“( [ 191, cf. [ 161). 
In accounts of non-prioritized belief change (in which the new information is given 
no special priority due to its novelty), S2 is satisfied, but S3 and S4 are not [ 141. 
The strongest possible version of Consistency is “K * a is consistent”. It has the 
following three weaker versions: 
Cl. If LY E K and TLY # K, then K * a is consistent. 
C2. If la # K, then K * a is consistent. 
C3. If TLY # Cn(0), then K * a is consistent. 
C4. K * a is consistent. 
In Cl, K * a is required to be consistent if KU {a} is consistent and equal to K, in C2, 
if KU {a} is consistent, and in C3 if (Y is consistent. C3 is the conventional consistency 
postulate of the belief revision literature [ 81. Its counterpart in nonmonotonic reasoning 
(if (Y FL then cr t-i) has been called consistency preservation [ 111. C4 has been 
called strong consistency preservation by Rott [ 221. 
The strongest possible version of Preservation is that K is always preserved, K C 
K * a. The very least that we can require is that if K is consistent, then it is preserved 
after a vacuous update (update by one of its elements). The following sequence contains 
two intermediate levels of preservation between these two: 
Pl. IfaEKandlcu#K,thenKCK*cr. 
P2. If ~a # K, then K 2 K * a. 
P3. IfpE K\(K*a), then lag Kand APE K*a. 
P4. KC K*a. 
P2 is the preservation postulate referred to in studies of the relations between belief 
revision and the logic of conditional sentences [ 91. Mostly, belief revisionists instead 
employ a related postulate: 
If~cr$K,thenCn(KU{cr})~K*a [7]. 
This postulate follows from our P2 and S2. In nonmonotonic reasoning, it corresponds 
to: If /$ T(Y and b a + p, then cy k p, that has been called weak rational monotony 
[ 111. P3 is a somewhat strengthened version of the following postulate that is discussed 
in [lo]: 
IfpE K\(K*a), then APE K*a (tenacity). 
The choice of the stronger variant for the present purposes has mainly technical reasons. 
P3, but not tenacity, is intermediate in strength between P2 and P4. Obviously, P4 is 
too strong to be a desirable property. It represents “too much” of a desideratum. 
The strongest possible version of Repellence is K * a & K, that requires all new 
information to be rejected. This is a highly implausible property of an update operation. 
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Clearly, incorporation of the input sentence must be allowed for at least in some cases. 
The following are weaker and more plausible postulates of repellence: 
RI. IfcrEKandTcu#K,thenK*aGK. 
R2. K*crCCn(KU{cu}). 
R2 is the inclusion postulate of belief revision [ 81. Its counterpart in nonmonotonic 
reasoning (If LY b y, then k a -+ 7) has been called weak conditionali.&on since it 
is a special case of conditionalization (If p&a b y, then p k LY -+ y) [ 111. 
3. Comparative criteria 
Comparative criteria for updating are concerned with the relationships between updates 
by different sentences. Such relationships can only be expected if the sentences are 
somehow related. Through our choice of a formal framework we have abstracted from 
non-logical relationships between sentences. Therefore, it remains to compare updates 
by sentences that are logically related. 
The strongest such relation is that of equivalence. We should expect logically equiv- 
alent sentences to be treated alike in updating: 
El. IfcuwPECn(0),thenK*cu=K*P. 
This is the extensionality postulate of belief revision [ 81. In nonmonotonic reasoning, 
the corresponding property (If t- LY H p, then a b y if p k r) is called left logical 
equivalence [ 111. 
It is less obvious how an updating system should treat two sentences, one of which 
implies the other. If the updates do not require deletion of old information, then the 
outcome of update by the stronger sentence should be a superset of the outcome of 
update by the weaker sentence: 
IfCn({a})CCn({p}),thenK*aCK*p (monotonicily) . 
If p contradicts K, then this is for most purposes a too strong requirement. It can be 
mitigated in various ways. The following series contains three variants with increasing 
strength (it is mostly more convenient to express monotonicity conditions in terms of 
the relation between a conjunction and one of its conjuncts): 
Ml. IfpEK*cuand~p#K+a,thenK*aCK*(cr&P). 
M2. If+$K*cu,thenK*czCK*(&@). 
M3. K*aC_K*(a&Q). 
Ml is a weakened version of the following condition on nonmonotonic inference: 
IfpE K*a, then K*aC K*(dz/3) ( cautious monotony [ 6,161) . 
M2 is closely related to the postulate of rational monotony in nonmonotonic reasoning 
and to its counterpart in belief revision: 
Iflp$?!K*cu,thenCn((K*cr)U{/3})CK*(cu&/?) (Giirdenfurs’*8 [S]). 
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The adjusted versions have been chosen in order to obtain the desired logical relation- 
ships in the sequence Ml, M2, M3. In most applications, M3 is too strong to be a 
desirable property. 
It would not make much sense to require in general the reversal of monotony, 
K * (a&P> C K * a. However, under the special condition that p E K * a, this 
condition is sensible. It can also be required that what K * (a&P) contains in addition 
to K * a should follow from K * a and p. These are antitonic relationships, i.e., they 
are (partial) reversals of monotony: 
Al. IfpE K*cx, then K*(a&~) C K*a. 
A2. K*(a&j?) cCn((K*cu)U{p}). 
In nonmonotonic reasoning, Al is called cut [ 161 and A2 is called conditionalization 
[ 11 ,181. A2 is also known from the belief revision literature as *7, Gtidenfors’ seventh 
revision postulate [ 81. 
4. Maximal satisfaction of the criteria 
The elementary properties of an updating system can be summarized in the form of 
a vector 
(Sn I , Cx2, Px3, Rx4) 
where Sxl is the highest S-criterion satisfied by the system. (If none of them is satisfied, 
then we write SO.) Such a vector will be called an SCPR-vector. Similarly, the properties 
of a database system with respect to the full set of critera, including the comparative 
ones, can be summarized in the form of a vector 
(Sx, , Cx2, Px3, Rx4, Exs , Mx6, Ax7). 
This will be called a SCPREMA-vector. 
It is not possible for all the criteria of Sections 2 and 3 to be satisfied at the same 
time, i.e., no updating system can satisfy: 
(S4,C4,P4,R2,El,M3,A2). 
The formal limits to satisfaction of the criteria can be expressed in terms of maximally 
satisfied vectors, as follows: 
Definition. A SCPR-vector (Sxl , Cx2, PXJ, Rx~) is satisfaction-maximal if and only if 
( 1) it is possible for an update system to satisfy (Sxl , Cx2, Px3, RXe), and 
(2) it is not possible for an update system to satisfy 
l (Sxl, , Cxz, Px3, Rxq) if x{ > XI, 
l (Sxl,Cx;,Px3,Rx4) if x$ > x2, 
l (SX~,CX~,PX$,RX~) if xi > x3, or 
0 (SXl ,CX2,PX3,RXi) if Xi > X4. 
Satisfaction-maximality of SCPREMA-vectors is defined analogously. 
There are only three satisfaction-maximal SCPR-vectors: 
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Observation 1. The following is a complete list of the satisfaction-maximal SCPR- 
vectors: (S4,C3, P3,R2), (S3, C4,P3,R2), and (S4, C2,P4,R2). 
(S4, c3, P3, R2) is satisfied by an updating system that employs AGM-style maxi- 
choice revision. (S3, C4, P3, R2) is satisfied by an updating system that employs AGM- 
style maxichoice revision except when the input (a in K * a) is inconsistent, in which 
case K * a is a maximal consistent subset of K. (S4, C2, P4, R2) is satisfied by AGM’s 
operation of expansion. For detailed constructions, and a full proof of the observation, 
the reader is referred to Appendix A. 
SCPREMA-vectors containing M3 represent the extreme case of database updating 
that satisfies monotonicity, i.e., never gives up old information. The operation * such 
that K * (Y = Cn( K U {a}) for all K and cy is characterized by the SCPREMA-vector 
(S4, C2, P4, R2, El, M3, A2), that can be shown to be satisfaction-maximal. The inter- 
esting satisfaction-maximal SCPREMA-vectors, though, are those that do not contain 
M3. It turns out that there are only two such vectors: 
Observation 2. The following is a complete list of the satisfaction-maximal SCPREMA- 
vectors that do not contain M3: (S4,C3,P3,R2,El,M2,A2) and (S3,C4,P3,R2,El, 
M2, A2). 
Hence, the only interesting conflict that remains after M3 has been given up is the 
obvious one between S4 and C4. (S4, C3,P3,R2,El,M2,A2) is satisifed by AGM’s 
transitively relational maxichoice revision. (S3, C4, P3, R2, El, M2, A2) is satisfied by 
a modified version of the same, such that if (Y is inconsistent, then K * a is the 
highest-ranked maximal consistent subset of K. Detailed constructions and a proof of 
the observation are given in Appendix A. 
More generally, it can be seen from Observations 1 and 2 that serious competition 
only occurs in the S-, C-, P-, and M-dimensions. In the remaining three dimensions, full 
satisfaction is always possible. 
5. Conclusion 
SCPREMA-vectors can be used to characterize the properties of updating systems and 
to compare in a precise manner how the conflicts between incompatible but desirable 
properties are settled in different such systems. We should not expect actual updating 
systems to always have satisfaction-maximal SCPREMA-vectors, but any failure of 
satisfaction-maximality should have an acceptable motivation. 
Appendix A. Proofs 
,C denotes the language, i.e., the set of all sentences. L denotes any contradictory sen- 
tence, i.e., any sentence 6 such that -v? E Cn(0). Furthermore, the following definition 
will be used in the proof: 
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Definition A.1 (Alchourrdn and Mukinson [2] ). Let A be a set of sentences and (Y a 
sentence. The set A J_ cy (“A remainder cu”) is the set of sets such that B E A _L cx if 
and only if: 
(i) B C A. 
(ii) CY 6 Cn(B). 
(iii) There is no set B’ such that B C B’ C A and CY # Cn( B’). 
Hence, K l_ a is the set of inclusion-maximal subsets of K that do not imply LY. 
The incompatibilities exhibited in the following lemma will be used several times in 
the proofs: 
Lemma A.2. 
( I ) C4 and S4 are incompatible. 
(2) P4 and C3 are incompatible. 
(3) M3, S3, C3, and P2 are incompatible. 
Proof. Part ( 1). They cannot both hold if (Y is inconsistent. 
Part (2). They cannot both hold if K is inconsistent. 
Part (3). Suppose that M3, S3, C3, and P2 are all satisfied. Let (Y and p be sentences, 
and K a set, such that -(&‘$I) # Cn(0), that ~(cu&p) E K and XY $! K. It follows 
from P2 that K C K*a and fromM3 that K*CY C K*(d$). Hence K C K*(a&/3). 
It follows from S3 that a&p E K * (a&p). Thus, K U a&P C K * (a&j?), so that 
K * (cd?@) is inconsistent, contrary to C3. 0 
Proof of Observation 1. We need to show (1) that each of the three listed vectors 
is satisfaction-maximal, and (2) that they are all the satisfaction-maximal satisfiable 
vectors that there are. 
Part ( IA) : Proof that (S4, C3, P3, R2) is a satisfaction-maximal SCPR-vector. We are 
first going to show that it is satisfiable. (What follows is essentially the construction of 
“choice” or “maxichoice” contraction according to [ 31.) 
Let s be a function such that for all logically closed sets K of sentences and all 
non-tautological sentences /I, s( K, K I /3) is an element of K I p, Furthermore, let * 
be an operation such that: 
(I) If Tck! $! Cn(8), then K * a = Cn(s(K, K -L TX) U {a}). 
(II) If icy E Cn(0), then K * a = L. 
S4: In both (I) and (II), a E K * a 
C3: If OCR # Cn( 0>, th en we are in case (I). Since s( K, K _L ~a) does not, by 
definition, imply icy, Cn( s( K, K i ~a) U {a}) is consistent. 
P3: Let ,B E K\(K * a). In case (I), it follows from K\( K * a) # 8 that s( K, K I 
~a) # K, and thus T(Y E Cn( K) = K. Furthermore, it follows from /? E K\( K * a) 
and s( K, K I ~a) E K I ~a that s( K, K I ~a) U {j?} implies 1% and thus 
s( K, K _I_ ~a) U(a) implies -p, i.e., K *a implies -/3_ Since K *a is logically closed, 
this means that -/3 E K * a. In case (II), we can conclude from T(Y E Cn(8) that 
TCY E K and from K * a = C that -/3 E K * a. 
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R2: In case (I) we have s( K, K I TX) c K, and thus 
K*rr=Cn(s(K,K I TX) U {a}) c Cn(KU{cu}). 
In case (II), it follows from icy E Cn( 8) that Cn( K U {a}) = C, and hence K * a 2 
Cn( K U {a}). 
Maximality: Since both the S- and the R-component have maximal values, it is 
sufficient to show that neither the C- nor the P-component can be increased without some 
other component being decreased. This follows quite straightforwardly from Lemma 
A.2. according to which ( 1) C4 and S4 are compatible, and (2) P4 and C3 are 
incompatible. 
Part ( IB) : Proof that (S3, C4, P3, R2) is a satisfaction-maximal SCPR-vector. We 
are first going to show that it is satisfiable. Just as in Part (lA), let s be a function 
such that for all K and all non-tautological ,G, s(K, K I /3) is an element of K i /?. 
Furthermore, let * be an operation such that: 
(I) If~a@Cn(Q)),thenK*(Y=Cn(s(K,KI~cu)U{cr}). 
(II) If SLY E Cn(@), then K * a = s(K, K II). 
S3: Directly from the definition (case (I) ) . 
C4: Directly from the definition. Note in case (I) that s( K, K I l(u) is an element 
of K i YZY, and thus does not imply -cr. 
P3: In case (I), it follows in the same way as in Part ( IA) of the present proof that 
-p E K * cr. In case (II), if K\( K * a) is non-empty, then s( K, K A_‘) # K, and thus 
K is inconsistent, i.e., K = L. It follows directly from this that 1~ E K. Furthermore, it 
follows from K * cr E K IL= C 1’ that K * a is a maximal consistent subset of the 
language; hence it follows from /3 $ K * a that -p E K * a. 
R2: As in Part ( 1A) of the present proof. 
Maximality: Since both the C-component and the R-component have maximal values, 
it is sufficient to show that neither the S- nor the P-component can be increased without 
a decrease in some other component. This follows directly from the two observations, 
given in Lemma A.2, that (1) S4 and C4 are incompatible and (2) P4 and C4 are 
incompatible. 
Part ( 1 C) : Proof that (S4, C2, P4, R2) is a satisfaction-maximal SCPR-vector. We are 
first going to show that it is satisfiable. Let K * a = Cn( K U {a}) for all K and (Y. It 
follows directly from the definition that S4, C2, P4, and R2 are all satisfied. 
Maximality: Since the S-, P-, and R- components all have maximal values, it is suffi- 
cient to show that the value of the C-component cannot be increased without a decrease 
in the value of some other component. This follows directly from the incompatibility of 
C3 and P4 that was shown in Lemma A.2. 
Part (2). It remains to prove that the three listed vectors are all the satisfaction- 
maximal SCPR-vectors that there are. 
Since (S4, C2, P4, R2) has maximal values in all components except the C-component, 
no satisfaction-maximal vector except this one can have a lower C-value than 3. With 
this we can restrict our search to vectors whose C-value is 3 or 4. 
Since C3 and P4 are incompatible (Lemma A.2, Part (2)), no satisfiable vector 
with the C-value 3 can contain P4. Since S4 and R2 represent maximal values in their 
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respective dimensions, it follows that any satisfiable vector with the C-value 3 must be 
either identical to or beaten by (S4, C3, P3, R2). 
Similarly, since C4 is not compatible with either S4 or P4 (Lemma A.2, Parts ( 1) and 
(2) ), no satisfiable vector with the C-value 4 can have an S- or a P-value that exceeds 
3. Since R2 represents a maximal value, we can conclude that all satisfiable vectors 
containing C4 are either identical to (S3, C4, P3, R2) or beaten by it. This concludes the 
proof. 0 
The following lemmas will be used in the proof of Observation 2: 
Lemma A.3 (Alchourron et al. [ 1 ] ). Let A be a logically closed set. Zf X E A 1 LY, 
thenXEAIpforallpEA\X. 
For a proof, the reader is referred to [ 11. 
Lemma A.4 Let A be a logically closed set. If LY E A and LY + /3 E Cn(B), then 
Al_PCAla. 
Proof. Let X E A I p. Then (Y @ X, and since a E A it follows from Lemma A.3 that 
XEAI-a. q 
Proof of Observation 2. We need to show ( 1) that the two listed vectors are 
satisfaction-maximal SCPREMA-vectors, and (2) that all other satisfaction-maximal 
SCPREMA-vectors have the M-value 3, i.e., they represent satisfaction of full mono- 
tonicity. 
Part ( 1A) : Proof that (S4, C3, P3, R2, El, M2, A2) is satisfaction-maximal. We first 
need to show that it is satisfiable. (What follows is essentially the construction of 
“orderly choice contraction” in [ 31, or transitively relational maxichoice contraction 
in the terminology of [ 1 ] .) Let < be a strict ordering on UK = {X 1 X E K I 
(Y for some a}. For each non-empty subset X of UK, let s(X) be the element of X that 
is ranked highest according to <. Let * be the operation such that: 
(I) If SLY $Z Cn(@), then K * a = Cn(s(K -L ~a) U {a}). 
(II) If lcuECn(Q)), then K*a=C. 
It follows from Part ( 1A) of the proof of Observation 1 that S4, C3, P3, and R2 are 
satisfied. That El is satisfied follows directly from the definition. 
M2: Let l/3 q! K * a. Then, according to (II), ~a $! Cn( 8)) and we are in case 
(I). Then -p 6 K * a = Cn(s(K -!_ la) U {a}) yields LY + l/3 # s(K I -m), i.e., 
-(a&p) @ s( K i ~a). It follows from Lemma A.3 that s( K _L ~a) E K I -(cd’@> 
and from Lemma A.4 that K I ~(a&/?) C K I TX Since s is based on <, we 
can conclude that s(K _L -(a&/3)> = s(K I TX). It follows directly from (I) that 
K*c~~K*(c&/3). 
A2: This is obvious if + E K * a. If lp 6 K * a, then (II) yields OCR 61 Cn(8). 
We then have (as was shown in the proof for M2) s( K _L TX) = s( K I l( a&p> ), 
K * a = Cn(s(K I YY) U {a}) and K * (a&p) = Cn(s(K _L l(a&/3)) U {a&/3}). 
From this it follows that A2 holds. 
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Maximality: Since all components except the C-, P- and M-components have their 
maximal values, it is sufficient to show that neither the C-, the P-, nor the M-component 
can be increased without some other component being decreased. That this holds for the 
C- and P-components can be proved exactly as in Part (1A) of the proof of Observation 
1. To show that this holds for the M-component, it is sufficient to note that according to 
Lemma A.2, M3, S3, C3, and P2 are incompatible, and hence so are M3, S4, C3, and 
P3. 
Part ( IB) : Proof that (S3, C4, P3, R2, El, M2, A2) is satisfaction-maximal. We first 
need to show that it is satisfiable. Let < be a strict ordering on UK. For each non-empty 
subset X of UK, let s(X) be the element of X that is ranked highest according to <. 
Let * be the operation such that: 
(I) If~cr$!Cn(8),thenK*a=Cn(s(KI~cz)U{~}). 
(II) If T(Y E Cn(@), then K* cy = s(K II). 
It follows from Part ( 1B) of the proof of Observation 1 that S3, C4, P3, and R2 are 
satisfied. That El is satisfied follows directly from the definition. 
The proofs for M2 and A2 coincide with the corresponding parts of Part (1A) of 
the present proof, except in the case when ~a E Cn(0). In that case, we also have 
-(cu&p) E Cn(0). It follows that K*a = K* (a&p> = s(K I’), from which M2 and 
A2 follow directly. 
Maximality: Since only the S-, P-, and M-components are non-maximal, it is sufficient 
to show that none of these can be increased without an increase in some other component. 
We know from Lemma A.2 that each of S4 and P4 is incompatible with C4. Furthermore, 
we know from the same lemma that M3, S3, C3, and P2 are incompatible, and hence 
so are M3, S3, C4, and P3. 
Part (2). Our search for satisfaction-maximal vectors with lower M-values than 3 can 
be divided into cases according to the value of the C-component. 
First case, the C-component is C4: according to Lemma A.2, S4 and C4 are in- 
compatible, and so are P4 and C4. Thus, any vector with C4 has at most S3 and at 
most P3. Hence, if it does not have M3 it must be either identical to or beaten by 
(S3,C4,P3,R2,El,M2,A2). 
Second case, the C-component is C3: according to Lemma A.2, P4 and C3 are 
incompatible. Thus, any vector with C3 has at most P3. Hence if it does not contain 
M3 it must be either identical to or beaten by (S4, C3,P3,R2,El,M2, A2). 
Third case, the C-component is at most C2: the operation referred to in Part ( 1C) 
of the proof of Observation 1 has the SCPREMA-vector (S4, C2, P4, R2, El, M3, A2). 
Since this vector is maximal in all components except the C-component, no satisfaction- 
maximal vector can have a C-component lower than C3 without containing M3. With 
this the proof is completed. •i 
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